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Abstract
A large literature lauds the beneﬁts of central bank transparency and credibility,
but when a central bank like the U.S. Federal Reserve has a dual mandate, is not spe-
ciﬁc to the extent it targets employment versus price stability, and is not speciﬁc to
the magnitude interest rates should change in response to these targets, market partic-
ipants must depend largely on past data to form expectations about monetary policy.
We suppose market participants estimate a Taylor-like regression equation to under-
stand the conduct of monetary policy, which likely guides their short-run and long-run
expectations. When the Federal Reserve's actions deviate from its historical targets for
macroeconomic variables, an environment of greater uncertainty may be the result. We
quantify this degree of uncertainty by measuring and aggregating recent deviations of
the federal funds rate from econometric forecasts predicted by constant gain learning.
We incorporate this measure of uncertainty into a VAR model with ARCH shocks to
measure the eﬀect monetary policy uncertainty has on inﬂation, output growth, un-
employment, and the volatility of these variables. We ﬁnd that a higher degree of
uncertainty regarding monetary policy is associated with greater volatility of output
growth and unemployment.
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Improving the public's understanding of the central bank's objectives and policy strategies
reduces economic and ﬁnancial uncertainty and thereby allows business and households to
make more informed decisions. ∼ Ben S. Bernanke, Speech to the Cato Institute 25th
Annual Monetary Conference, November 17, 2007.
1 Introduction
Bernanke demonstrates in this quote that the Federal Reserve recognizes the value in keeping
the public informed about the conduct of monetary policy. Even so, the Federal Reserve has a
dual mandate to promote both employment and inﬂation stability and it does not explicitly
communicate relative importance for each of these goals, and does not communicate an
explicit long-run target for inﬂation as central banks from some other countries do. One
might argue the reason for being vague is to give monetary policy ﬂexibility to address new
short-run economic challenges while maintaining credibility to keep inﬂation at moderate
levels in the long run. However, the lack of complete communication concerning the conduct
of monetary policy may create some uncertainty among market participants concerning short-
run and long-run monetary policy actions. The purpose of this paper is to measure the
degree of monetary policy uncertainty in the U.S. economy over the last several decades,
and examine the eﬀect uncertainty has on levels of output growth, unemployment, inﬂation,
and the volatility of these variables.
Many authors have found monetary policy transparency and credibility important are for
macroeconomic stability. For example, Cecchetti and Krause (2002) ﬁnd evidence for this
from 60 central banks around the world. Cecchetti, Flores-Langunes, and Kruase (2006)
ﬁnd for 20 countries around the world that 80% of the reduction in macroeconomic volatility
since the early 1980s can be attributed to better monetary policy, and that credibility and
transparency plays an important role. Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) suggests that the de-
crease in macroeconomic volatility since the early 1980s in the United States was due in large
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part to an established, and therefore well understood, monetary policy that put its greatest
emphasis on inﬂation targets. Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2002) similarly ﬁnd evidence for
countries across the world that central banks that have shifted focus to inﬂation stability,
either explicitly or implicitly, have sucessfully limited both inﬂation and output volatility
since the early 1980s.
All these papers suggest that monetary policy that is well understood by the public
leads greater macroeconomic stability, and many attribute the slow down of macroeconomic
volatility around the world since the early 1980s to precisely this. A related literature exam-
ines the eﬀect macroeconomic volatility has on levels of inﬂation and output growth, where
volatility is used as a measure for economic uncertainty. Examples from this literature in-
clude Grier and Perry (2000), Fountas (2001), Fountas, Karanasos, and Kim (2002), Grier,
Henry, Olekalns, and Shields (2004), Fountas, Karanasos, and Kim (2006), and Fountas and
Karanasos (2007). All these papers use autoregressive heteroskedastic models, with vary-
ing complications, to establish measures of economic uncertainty. While results sometimes
depend on the speciﬁcation of the model, most of the papers agree that higher inﬂation un-
certainty has a negative impact on economic growth. In a sense, the implication for monetary
policy may agree with Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) in that successful inﬂation targeting
can lead to better macroeconomic outcomes.
The above papers are limited in that they do not focus speciﬁcally on uncertainty con-
cerning monetary policy, and they cannot separate heteroskedasticity and uncertainty, so
as to determine the impact uncertainty has volatility. The present paper takes a step in
each of these directions. Motivated by the literature on transparency and inﬂation targeting
which suggests well-understood policy leads to desirable outcomes, the present work mea-
sures monetary policy uncertainty in the U.S. by measuring market participants perceptions
of monetary policy. Speciﬁcally, we suppose agents estimate a Taylor-like regression rule
where the federal funds rate responds to inﬂation, output growth, and unemployment. Since
the Fed does not explicitly communicate the relative importance of inﬂation and employment
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stability, the target inﬂation rate, or how responsive the federal funds rate is to ﬂuctuations
in these variables, we argue monetary policy is transparent when its actions are predictable,
based on estimates of the linear regression monetary policy rule using data available to agents
at the time.
We re-estimate the Taylor-like regression rule for each period in our sample, using only
the data prior to this period which would realistically be available to market participants at
the time. Speciﬁcally, we use a constant-gain least squares learning algorithm in the style
of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) which supposes agents give relatively more weight to more
recent observations. We use the root mean squared error from this regression as our measure
of monetary policy uncertainty and report the evolution of agents' expectations and agents'
levels of uncertainty over the sample period. We then estimate the impact uncertainty has
on levels of output growth, unemployment and inﬂation and the volatility of these variables.
We fail to ﬁnd evidence that uncertainty aﬀects the levels of these variables, but we ﬁnd
statistically signiﬁcant evidence that higher uncertainty leads to greater volatility of output
growth and unemployment.
2 Estimating Monetary Policy
2.1 Data
We use quarterly data on output growth, inﬂation, unemployment, and the federal funds rate
from 1965:Q1 though 2010:Q2. Output growth is measured using the annualized quarterly
percentage growth rate in real GDP, and inﬂation is measured using the annualized quarterly
percentage growth rate in the GDP deﬂator. The data was obtained using the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database.
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2.2 Learning
Agents learn how the Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy by estimating the following
policy rule similar to Taylor (1993),
rt = α0 + αrrt + αpipit−1 + αggt−1 + αuut−1 + t (1)
which recognizes that the Fed may adjust the nominal federal funds rate rate (rt) in response
to past inﬂation (pit−1), past growth rate of real GDP (gt−1), and past unemployment (ut−1).
Taylor (1999) and Orphanides (2003), among others, have suggest the Taylor rule is a useful
framework to use to understand the conduct of monetary policy. McCallum (1997) also
suggests it is realistic to have a Taylor rule that has the federal funds rate decision responding
to lagged values of variables instead of concurrent values as this best reﬂects the actual data
available to policy makers at the time of a decision. Using lagged values also makes a
convenient equation for market participants to estimate using least-squares techniques as
the explanatory variables are exogenous.
At every time t agents re-estimate equation (1) using past data up through period t− 1.
Let xτ = [1 piτ−1 gτ−1 uτ−1]′ denote the vector of explanatory variables used to predict rτ
and αˆt = [αˆ0,t αˆpi,t αˆg,t αˆu,t]
′ denote the time t estimate for the regression coeﬃcients. If
agents estimate equation (1) by ordinary least squares, then the estimates for the coeﬃcient
at time t is given by,
αˆt =
(
1
t
t∑
τ=1
xt−τx′t−τ
)−1 (
1
t
t∑
τ=1
xt−τrt−τ
)
. (2)
This can be conveniently re-written in the following recursive form,
αˆt = αˆt−1 + γtR−1t xt−1
(
rt−1 − x′t−1αˆt−1
)
(3)
Rt = Rt−1 + γt
(
xt−1x′t−1 −Rt−1
)
(4)
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where gt−1 = 1/t is called the learning gain and is equal to the weight given to the most
recent observation. This recursive representation nicely illustrates the manner in which
expectations are adaptive. The term in parentheses on the right hand side of equation (3) is
the error that was made forecasting rt−1 using the previous period's estimate for coeﬃcients.
The degree to which the current estimate for αt is updated from the previous estimate αt−1
depends on the forecast error and the size of the learning gain, γt. The larger is the error
made with the previous estimate, the larger is the update. The larger is the learning gain,
the larger is the update. Since the learning gain is the inverse of the sample size, it is large
when the sample size is small. When the sample size is small, adding a new observation
has a relatively large impact on the estimated coeﬃcients. As time approaches inﬁnity, the
sample size approaches inﬁnity and the learning gain approaches zero. When there are a
large number of observations, a new observation has a negligible eﬀect on the estimates.
As time progresses with ordinary least squares, the learning algorithm converges on a
set of coeﬃcients, and uncertainty about how the Fed conducts monetary policy disappears.
Also, if market participants always use ordinary least squares, they never suspect that a
structural change in monetary policy is possible. If a structural change did occur, market
participants would learn about it, but only very slowly. Structural change or not, the weight
put on new observations gets smaller and smaller and all observations from the beginning of
time are given equal weight.
There is strong evidence that structural changes in Taylor rule occurred at multiple
times in U.S. history. Taylor (1999), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), and Orphanides
(2003), among others, ﬁnd statistical evidence that the Federal Reserve more heavily targeted
inﬂation after Paul Volker's appointment as Fed Chairman in 1979. Constant gain learning
is an alternative framework where agents can learn about structural changes and learning
dynamics do not disappear over time. Constant gain learning simply replaces the learning
gain, γt, with a constant value, γ ∈ (0, 1). Repeated substitution of equations (3) and
(4) shows that constant gain learning is equivalent to the following weighted least squares
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estimator,
αˆt =
(
(1− γ)
t∑
τ=1
γτxt−τx′t−τ
)−1 (
(1− γ)
t∑
τ=1
γτxt−τrt−τ
)
. (5)
Equation (5) indicates the weight observations from τ periods in the past is equal to (1−γ)γτ .
Since γ ∈ (0, 1), most recent observations are given the highest weight and the weights decline
geometrically with time. One may view this as a learning mechanism for agents that have a
constant suspicion of structural change that is not directly observable. Agents do not have
a formal understanding of the size of changes that could occur or the probabilities for which
they could occur, so they simply put the most weight on the observations which are most
likely to reﬂect the current structure of the economy.
Computing the coeﬃcients for constant gain learning using the recursive algorithm given
in equations (3) and (4) requires an initial condition for αˆ0 and R0. The sample period
studied in the this paper runs from 1965:Q1 though 2010:Q2. We use the ten years prior to
this sample (1955:Q1 through 1964:Q4) to construct an estimate for the initial conditions
for the learning process. We estimate the Taylor rule given in equation (1) with ordinary
least squares and use the estimated coeﬃcients to initialize αˆ0 and the average of the outer
product, xtx
′
t, to initialize R0.
Figure 1 shows the path of the constant gain learning coeﬃcients for a learning gain,
γ = 0.02, which is a value close to what is estimated in the literature (see for example, Milani
(2007) and Slobodyan and Wouters (2008)). Most evident from these graphs is that agents
have learned about frequent structural changes in the Taylor rule regression relationship;
the coeﬃcients do not remain near a constant value over time. The coeﬃcient on the lagged
federal funds rate (measuring federal funds rate persistence) towards the end of the sample is
only recently very close to 1.0, but from the early 1990s through early 2000s this persistence
parameter was lower (about 0.85) and for the 20 years before that even lower (about 0.8).
There were also substantial swings in the coeﬃcient in the 1970s and early 1980s. Most
notably there was a large drop in perceived persistence in 1980 when then Fed Chairman
Paul Volcker substantially raised interest rates to combat very high inﬂation.
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The coeﬃcient on inﬂation shows that there was an increase in the response of the federal
funds rate to lagged inﬂation following the early 1970s and a most drastic, yet temporary,
increase in 1980, as the Fed suddenly fought hard against inﬂation. Following this episode,
the response of the federal funds rate to inﬂation has remained relatively high compared to
the early 1970s, and this ﬁnding in consistent with Taylor (1999), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2000), and Orphanides (2003), as previously cited. However, we see in Figure 1 that this
coeﬃcient has fallen to pre-1970 levels since the monetary easing following the 2001 recession
under then Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan and most recently during the 2008-2009 recession
under Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke.
The coeﬃcients on output growth and unemployment also exhibit signiﬁcant changes, also
coinciding with the run-up of inﬂation in the 1970s, the evident regime change as Volcker
becomes Chairman, and the recessions taking place in 1991, 2001, and 2008. A particularly
interesting pair of structural changes to the coeﬃcient on unemployment takes place in 1980
and again in 1990. The coeﬃcient starts out negative, implying the Fed lowers the federal
funds rate in response to an increase in unemployment. The sudden movement towards 0.0
in 1980 shows again that the Fed changed its emphasis completely away from concerns about
unemployment (and towards inﬂation as we saw earlier). However, this was not a permanent
change as other papers have implied. Rather we see another drop in the coeﬃcient (larger
negative numbers implying the Fed is putting greater emphasis on unemployment) occurring
just before the 1991 recession and remaining at lower levels compared to the 1980s.
2.3 Uncertainty
The results from previous subsection show that market participants may have learned about
a number of monetary policy changes from the last several decades. Even so, such changes
do take time to learn about, and changes in the conduct of monetary policy can have the im-
mediate eﬀect of agents making inaccurate forecasts. An environment of uncertainty results
when recent actions of the Federal Reserve deviate from market participants' expectations.
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Deviations of market expectations are captured by the residuals from market participants
weighted least-squares estimates of the Taylor rule given in equation (1). The larger are the
average squared residuals from this regression, the larger will be the variance of the forecast
for rt+τ , and the larger will be variance for forecasts for any variable that depends on expec-
tations of future interest rates. For a given value for γ, we use the following root (weighted)
mean squared residuals (RMSR) as a measure of the degree of uncertainty caused by recent
unpredicted monetary policy actions,
mγ,t =
√√√√(1− γ) t∑
τ=1
γτ (rt−τ − x′t−τ αˆt−τ )2. (6)
Figure 2 shows the evolution of uncertainty over the sample period. Despite market
participants being able to learn about changes in monetary policy, as discussed in the last
subsection, there have been some notable changes in uncertainty. The run-up of inﬂation in
the 1970s were also accompanied with a run-up of uncertainty. As we saw earlier, agents
were able to learn about, at least partially, Volker's signiﬁcant changes in policy, but this
period also marks the most signiﬁcant increases in monetary policy uncertainty. This high
level of uncertainty continued until about 1984. Since then, relative to the 1970s and early
1980s, uncertainty about monetary policy has been relatively small, but there still have been
frequent jumps in the RMSR to 0.1, or 10 basis points, and towards the end of the sample
the RMSR jumped to 20 basis points, the same time as the Fed decreased the federal funds
rate to an historical low.
3 Macroeconomic Impact
In the previous section we quantiﬁed the degree of uncertainty among market participants
concerning the conduct of monetary policy. We now turn to estimating the impact this
uncertainty has on the macroeconomy. Speciﬁcally, we are interested in determining whether
uncertainty adversely aﬀects output growth, inﬂation, unemployment, or the volatility of
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these variables. We answer this question in the context of reduced form vector autoregression
(VAR) model with autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (ARCH) shocks. The VAR
speciﬁcation is general enough to allow for interactions of output growth, inﬂation, and
unemployment as might be speciﬁed by a dynamic general equilibrium model or more simply-
stated macroeconomic theory. The ARCH shocks are added to allow for exogenous time-
varying macroeconomic volatility.
3.1 Impact on Levels
Consider the following augmented ﬁrst order VAR(1),
gt = βg,0 + βg,ggt−1 + βg,pipit−1 + βg,uut−1 + βg,rrt−1 + βg,δ + λgmγ,t + νg,t
pit = βpi,0 + βpi,ggt−1 + βpi,pipit−1 + βpi,uut−1 + βpi,rrt−1 + βpi,δ + λpimγ,t + νpi,t
ut = βu,0 + βu,ggt−1 + βu,pipit−1 + βu,uut−1 + βu,rrt−1 + βu,δ + λumγ,t + νu,t,
(7)
where each of the stochastic shock terms, νt, has a zero mean and possibly evolving variance,
η2t , which is discussed in the next subsection. Besides this, the standard VAR is augmented
in another two ways. First, we include the lagged interest rate, rt−1, to allow monetary
policy to inﬂuence these variables. More signiﬁcantly, we include the measure of monetary
policy uncertainty, mγ,t, as an explanatory variable to measure the impact uncertainty has
on the levels for output growth, inﬂation, unemployment. We saw in the previous section
that this measure depends on a calibration for the learning gain. In this paper, we consider
the following three learning gains which are close to values found in the literature, γ ∈
{0.01, 0.02, 0.05}.
The estimation results are given in Table 1. The results show that the measure of market
participants' uncertainty regarding monetary policy, mγ,t, is not statistically signiﬁcant in
any of the regressions. Therefore we fail to ﬁnd evidence that this type of uncertainty aﬀects
levels of output growth, inﬂation, or unemployment. The most signiﬁcant explanatory vari-
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able in each regression is each variable's own lag, indicating these variables have signiﬁcant
degrees of persistence. Besides this, we have two sets of statistically signiﬁcant results that
help describe the dynamics of the data. We ﬁnd that lagged output growth is signiﬁcantly
negatively related to unemployment, which is indicative of changes in unemployment lagging
behind changes in the business cycle. Also, lagged unemployment is signiﬁcantly positively
related to output growth, possibly as indication of V-shaped recession recoveries where
periods of high unemployment at the end of a recession are followed by high levels of growth
during the recovery.
3.2 Impact on Macroeconomic Volatility
The previous subsection found that monetary policy uncertainty does not aﬀect levels of
output growth, inﬂation, and unemployment, but that does not rule out the possibility
that monetary policy uncertainty aﬀects the volatility of the macroeconomy. To test this
possibility, we allow the variances of the stochastic shock terms in the VAR described above
to evolve over time. We model this with a relatively simple ﬁrst order ARCH which allows
the variances to evolve exogenously over time, but we augment the model to allow monetary
policy uncertainty to also aﬀect macroeconomic volatility. We estimate the following models,
η2g,t = θ0,g + θg,gη
2
g,t−1 + µgm
2
γ,t + υg,t
η2pi,t = θ0,pi + θpi,gη
2
pi,t−1 + µpim
2
γ,t + υpi,t
η2u,t = θ0,u + θu,gη
2
u,t−1 + µum
2
γ,t + υu,t
(8)
where η2t in each equation is the time t variance for the stochastic shock from the previous
VAR model, and υt in each equation is independently and identically distributed.
The estimation results are given in Table 2. The results show monetary policy uncertainty
(as measured by m2γ,t) signiﬁcantly explains the changing volatility of unemployment and
output growth, but not inﬂation. That is, higher monetary policy uncertainty leads to less
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stability in output growth and unemployment.
4 Conclusion
The Federal Reserve has a dual mandate to promote stability in employment and inﬂation
and to maintain ﬂexibility, it does not communicate precise targets for each nor the degree
to which the federal funds rate will be adjusted in response to each. Market participants
decisions often depend on expectations for variables that depend on expectations for mone-
tary policy. We use a Taylor rule regression equation and a constant gain learning model to
compute market participants estimates for the conduct of monetary policy, and we develop
a measure for the degree of uncertainty caused by unpredicted monetary policy changes by
aggregating recent squared residuals. We ﬁnd evidence consistent with other literature that
monetary policy (as described by a Taylor rule) has evolved over the last several decades,
along with market participants perceptions of monetary policy. Despite the ability for market
participants to learn about monetary policy, changes in policy also coincide with increases
in monetary policy uncertainty.
We incorporate the measure of monetary policy uncertainty into a VAR(1) model of
output growth, inﬂation, unemployment, and interest rates with ARCH(1) errors. The
VAR(1) results indicate there is insuﬃcient evidence to conclude monetary policy uncertainty
aﬀects levels of output growth, inﬂation, or unemployment, but the ARCH(1) results do
show that higher monetary policy uncertainty leads to greater volatility for output growth
and unemployment. The policy implications may be important to central bankers if new
challenges call for new monetary policy prescriptions. Changes in policy may lead to an
environment of increased uncertainty, which we ﬁnd creates less stability in output growth
and unemployment.
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Figure 1: Estimated Regression Coeﬃcients with Learning (γ = 0.02)
Figure 2: Uncertainty About Monetary Policy: Root (Weighted) Mean Squared Residuals
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